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Abstract
This article provides a rationalization of (at least partial) professional
self-regulation resting on the joint production of individual and collec-
tive reputations and its impact on the quality of professional services. It
presents a short model that aims to show that (i) a high-quality steady-
state exists in a market for a credence goods and that (ii) the likelihood
of high quality increases when the market is self-regulated by the profes-
sion in comparison to the situation where there is no self-regulation. The
law and economics literature usually criticizes self-regulation as a modern
form of corporatism; we show that it may help to regulate quality when
clients are faced with opportunistic professionals.
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1. Introduction
The law and economics literature usually criticizes self-regulation (SR) as
a modern form of corporatism which reduces competition and increases prices.
Lawyers, doctors, architects, and various other professionals organized in pro-
fessional associations are seen as issuing anticompetitive regulations (entry re-
strictions, monopoly rights, etc.) protecting their own interests and increasing
their rents at the expense of clients (Kay and Vickers, 1988, Van den Bergh
and Faure, 1991, Van den Bergh, 1993, 2008). However, SR also reduces the
discrepency in information between the regulator and the regulatee and may
therefore facilitate e¢ cient regulation to the bene￿t of consumers (Miller, 1985;
Gehrig and Jost, 1995; Ogus, 1999; Nuæez, 2001). This article proposes an eco-
nomic rationale for the SR of professions which takes into account both the costs
and bene￿ts associated with SR in the law and economics literature. We show
that although SR grants professions with a rent, it also maintains a high-quality
equilibrium in markets for professional services. Depriving the profession of the
possibility of self-regulation and, therefore, of the capacity to appropriate a rent
would lead to a decrease in the quality of the services provided. Indeed, profes-
sional services are usually characterized as credence goods, i.e. goods for which
customers are unable to assess the quality either ex ante or ex post (Darbi et
Karny, 1973) and barely know, even after purchase, if they have been under
1or over served by the professional (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). Lack of
certitude concerning the quality of professional services opens up the possibility
of reputational concerns. On the one hand, word-of-mouth and other clients￿
referrals provide consumers with imperfect information about the individual
reputation of a particular professional On the other hand, the collective rep-
utation of the profession provides additional information. The profession has
an incentive to maintain a good collective reputation as this increases the rent
that accrues to the group. Therefore, SR may help in regulating quality when
consumers are faced with opportunistic professionals.
The second section presents the assumptions. The third section examines
the high and low quality steady states in a market for credence goods. The
fourth section provides elements of discussion and concludes.
2. Assumptions
We consider a stationary market for a professional service where the popu-
lation of professionals is constant. We assume that the probability for a profes-
sional to remain in the market up to the next date is ￿ 2 (0;1), the proportion
of newcomers being therefore (1 ￿ ￿) at each given date. All the agents share
the same discount rate ￿.
At each date, a customer chooses a supplier and buys the service. Three
types of suppliers are considered: "good" professionals in proportion h, "bad"
ones in proportion l and "opportunistic" ones in proportion u, where h+l+u = 1.
These proportions remain the same at each date and therefore for each cohort
of newcomers.
Good professionals always provide high quality. Bad ones always provide
low quality. Opportunistic suppliers rationally choose to deliver high quality
only if the cost of e⁄ort e incurred when producing high quality is o⁄set by
their expected gains. Suppliers know which type they themselves are, whereas
consumers only know the proportions h, l and u, but not the actual type of the
particular professional they are matched with. The price they are willing to pay
depends on the expected quality which in turn depends on the type and e⁄ort
of the professional. We assume for the purpose of simplicity that the customer￿ s
payo⁄ is 1 when (s)he receives high quality and 0 otherwise.
Consumers derive information on quality from (1) the individual reputation
of the professional and (2) the collective reputation of the profession.
(1) Individual reputation refers to the quality that the professional has de-
livered in the past (MacLeod, 2007). We assume that the customer imperfectly
observes a ￿ track record￿of the professional￿ s past actions and uses this infor-
mation to update his or her current belief about the quality (s)he is buying:
word-of-mouth and other clients￿referrals only provide customers with imper-
fect information on the actual quality associated with a particular professional.
￿k denotes the probability that the customer will observe that the professional
has produced low quality in the past at least once when he has in fact cheated
on quality k times. Following Tirole (1996), we assume that:
￿0 = 0 < ￿1 < ￿2 < ::: < 1 and ￿k+1 ￿ ￿k < ￿k ￿ ￿k￿1 for all k (1)
2The more frequently a professional has produced low quality in the past, the
more likely it is that the customer is informed about him or her having delivered
low quality at least once. Thus a supplier has an all the better reputation as
￿k is close to ￿0 = 0 ((s)he has never been observed delivering low quality); by
contrast, (s)he has an all the worse reputation as ￿k reaches 1, meaning that
(s)he has been observed delivering low quality nearly the k times (s)he did it.
This likelihood increases at a decreasing rate, inciting a professional producing
low quality at date k to cheat again at date k + 1.
The detection of poor quality by a customer at date k is excluded from the
market for the current period. Thus, the sanction is only temporary and the
supplier will be matched with another consumer at the next date.
(2) In addition, consumers obtain information from the collective reputation
of the profession. A collective reputation encapsulates consumers￿beliefs about
the average quality of the services which have been delivered by the profession
in the past. Consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the service when
the profession has a good reputation. Conversely, a lower price is associated
with a bad collective reputation. Therefore, a higher (lower) rent accrues to the
profession when it has a good (or bad) collective reputation. Hence, it is in the
profession￿ s interest to maintain a good collective reputation. Furthermore, the
profession can observe the quality produced by its members. Now, the individual
track records of members can be observed by the profession only imperfectly.
Let ￿P
k be the probability that the profession will observe that a professional
has provided low quality at least once in the past when he has in fact produced
it k times:
￿P
0 = 0 < ￿P
1 < ￿P




k￿1 for all k (2)
Due to its expertise, the profession is likely to be better informed than
consumers within a market for credence goods: ￿P
k > ￿k for all k. This re￿ ects
the literature on SR according to which the profession is better informed about
the actual behaviours of its members than non members1. The profession strikes
o⁄a service provider anytime it has evidence of him or her providing low quality,
with no cost involved either in striking a member o⁄ or in replacing him or her;
thus at each date the size of the professional group is constant2. Exclusion based
on detection by the profession is permanent and precludes any transaction with
future consumers, in contrast with the former situation.
We assume that there are no informational transfers between consumers and
profession. Indeed, consumers cannot report an individually observed low level
of quality to the profession. Nor can the profession directly inform consumers
about individual quality. However, membership of the profession can be ob-
served by consumers perfectly and at no cost. It signals to consumers that a
professional has not (or not yet) been observed to be delivering low quality by
his or her fellow members.
1We do not consider type II errors: bad suppliers can be misinterpreted as being good ones
but good suppliers can not be mistaken for bad ones.
2We do not introduce screening among lawyers at the hiring stage; we therefore do not
take into account one of the main functions of the profession: the selection of new entrants.
3We de￿ne Sk as the average probability for low-quality service providers to
remain undetected by both the profession and consumers at date k. Among the
(1￿￿) newcomers at date t (who have not produced yet and therefore have not
been given the opportunity to cheat on quality), ￿ still belong to the profession
at the next date if they have not been detected by the profession, which occurs
with a probability (1￿￿P
0 )(1￿￿P
1 ):::(1￿￿P
t ). In addition, the probability that a
provider consistently delivering low quality wil remain undetected by consumers
at date t is (1 ￿ ￿t). Therefore, within the population of professionals, the
average probability of having a good reputation when already delivering low
quality (because low quality production remains unnoticed by the customer and
the profession) is:




t(1 ￿ ￿t)(1 ￿ ￿P
0 )(1 ￿ ￿P
1 ):::(1 ￿ ￿P
t ) (3)
Sk decreases according to how well-informed both the profession and the
consumers are. Moreover, it decreases with ￿: an increase in the survival rate
reduces rate of revewal of the population, and makes it easier to observe cheat-
ing.
3. High- and low- quality steady states
The joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations generate two
steady states in pure strategies: a high quality one and a low quality one3. We
de￿ne a high- (low-) quality steady state as the situation in which all oppor-
tunistic professionals always choose to produce high (low) quality.
3.1. The high-quality steady state
Sk gives the average probability of having a good reputation at date t in
the market. The proportion of bad professionals having a good reputation is
therefore lS. Thus, the customer￿ s willingness to pay for the service depends on
the average quality in the market that is given by the probability for the client





1 ￿ l + lSk
(4)
The highest p￿
H is obtained when all the opportunistic professionals have
an incentive to supply high quality. That is to say, their expected gains are
greater than their cost of e⁄ort. On the one hand, by consistently providing
high quality, an opportunistic supplier avoids the risk of being excluded from
3We focus on pure strategies despite the possibility of mixed strategies by agents. We are
not interested in studying the multiplicity of steady states but only the high and the low
quality equilibria.
4the profession and the risk of losing an informed customer at date t. On the
other hand, (s)he incurs the cost of e⁄ort e. His (her) expected payo⁄ is then:
p￿
H ￿ e + ￿(p￿
H ￿ e) + ￿
2(p￿





Let us suppose instead that this opportunistic supplier chooses to consis-
tently produce low quality. In this case, (s)he runs the risk of either being
detected by the profession and struck o⁄, or not being detected by the profes-
sion but by a customer and therefore losing this customer for the current period.
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denotes the present expected probability for the opportunistic professional of
being detected either by the profession or by a customer at any future date
due to low quality service. Obviously, A￿increases with ￿k and ￿P
k respectively;
furthermore, given that ￿P
k > ￿k, A￿ increases faster with ￿P
k than with ￿k.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of the high quality

















This condition requires that the expected gain attached to a good (individual
and collective) reputation (￿p￿
HA￿) be high enough to deter opportunistic sup-
pliers from cheating on quality. It is ful￿lled if the cost of e⁄ort is not too high
and/or p￿
H is high, which occurs when the (given) proportion of bad suppliers
is su¢ ciently low. Furthermore, it also holds true whenever A￿ is high, mean-
ing that low quality production is not too badly detected. In the extreme case
of perfect information (Sk = 0 and A￿ = 1), a unique high-quality stationary
equilibrium exists and reputational considerations play no role.
3.2. The low-quality steady state
Symmetrically, a low-quality steady state is de￿ned as a situation in which
all the opportunistic suppliers consistently provide low quality. In this case, the
5proportion of professionals providing low quality but having a deceptively good








L is obtained when all the opportunistic professionals supply
low quality. Then, customers are willing to pay no more than p￿
L since they
expect the average quality in the market to be low. Let us remark that p￿
L
and p￿
H tend to 1when Sk tends towards 0, meaning that the profession and
consumers perfectly detect low quality.
Following the same reasoning as above, a necessary and su¢ cient condition





Hence, the low-quality steady state exists when the expected gains derived
from a bad reputation are too low to o⁄set the present cost of e⁄ort4. This is
the case when the cost of e⁄ort is su¢ ciently high and/or when p￿
L is low, i.e.
when opportunistic and bad suppliers are quite numerous. Condition 10 is also
met when A￿ is low, i.e. whenever low quality production is not easily detected
by the profession and the consumers. In the extreme case of no information
at all (Sk = 1 and A￿ = 0), a unique low-quality stationary equilibrium exists
and the consumers￿willingness to pay only depends on the proportion of good
professionals on the market.
4. Discussion and conclusion
We show that a high-quality steady-state exists in a market for a credence
good and that the likelihood of high quality provision of services increases when
the market is self-regulated by the profession in comparison to the situation
where there is no SR. Indeed, when there is no SR in the market, individual
reputation is the only informative and disciplinary device which operates5. Now,
as consumers￿information is by de￿nition limited in the case of credence goods,
a professional delivering low quality only faces a low probability of being de-
tected (this can be seen from equation 7). Then, the average probability of a
professional keeping a deceptive good reputation is high (equation 3). There-
fore, individual reputation only provides a low-powered incentive to supply high
quality. Without SR, then, low quality can be expected to prevail in professional
service markets.
More precisely, our model accounts for the existence of a high-quality steady
state in markets for professional services by introducing the idea of the collective
reputation of the profession into the analysis. We ￿nd that a high quality equi-
librium is more likely with a collective reputation than without it. This is due
4As conditions 8 and 10 are not mutually exclusive, multiple steady states may exist.
5The article does not consider alternative forms of regulation and concentrates on the SR
vs free (unregulated) market debate.
6to the rent that accrues to the profession when its collective reputation is good.
Indeed, when quality is low, consumers are only willing to pay a low price for the
service they purchase and the individual rent that accrues to suppliers tends to
0. Whereas consumers have a higher willingness to pay, resulting in a positive
rent to the profession, when they expect to receive high quality, that is, when the
profession has a good collective reputation6. As consumers derive information
about quality not only from individual reputation but also - and mostly - from
the collective reputation of the profession, a higher price, and therefore a higher
rent, is associated with a good collective reputation. Therefore, the share that a
professional expects to appropriate individually from membership to the profes-
sion is higher when collective reputation is good7. Now, consumers are unable to
observe the quality of a professional directly, but they can observe membership
to the profession perfectly and at no cost. Hence, the profession as a whole has
an incentive to exclude those members who are observed to be cheating in order
to maintain a good reputation. The threat of exclusion and the corresponding
exit costs (i.e. the potential loss of income) provide professionals with incen-
tives to supply high quality. Furthermore, due to its expertise, the profession
has better information about the actual quality delivered by its members than
consumers and can detect cheating more easily, although it can observe indi-
vidual quality only imperfectly. This is consistent with the law and economics
literature according to which the regulation of the profession by its own mem-
bers reduces the cost of informing consumers. From our model, it emerges that
with collective reputation, condition 8 is more easily satis￿ed than condition 10.
Therefore, we conclude that high quality provision of professional services may
be more likely with a self-regulated profession than with a free (non-regulated)
market. Although professional SR is usually criticized as giving professionals an
opportunity to capture a rent at the expense of clients, our analysis shows that
the rent also serves as an incentive to the profession to build and maintain a
good collective reputation. Ultimately, our analysis encompasses and combines
both economic views on SR - both as a way to capture rents and as a regulatory
device economizing on informational costs - into a single model. This type of
approach to SR is new to our knowledge and supports a non-Manichean view
of SR.
Our model underlines the impact of the prior (exogeneous) distribution of
professional types on the equilibria conditions. Indeed, if one assumes that there
are few bad suppliers (l is low), then p￿
H is high (resp. and p￿
L is low) and con-
dition 8 holds (resp. condition 10 does not hold). The selection of newcomers
(whoever the authority in charge of this selection may be) is then crucial to
building and/or maintaining the collective reputation of a profession. Introduc-
ing screening of newcomers therefore represents an interesting develppment to
our analysis. The issue of rent sharing among individual professionals and the
optimal choice for the profession between covering-up or disclosing the infor-
6The di⁄erence between the consumers￿willingness to pay in the case of sole individual
reputation and their willingness to pay in the case of both reputations is the professional rent
(see the Appendix)
7In this preliminary model, we do not consider issues on sharing.
7mation about members￿cheating are further areas of the model that should be
developed in future research
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